Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

This case involved a suit by a holder of auction rate notes issued under an Indenture of Trust and certain "Supplemental Indentures" thereto, against the issuer of the notes, and the trust. Plaintiff claimed that the issuer caused the trust to pay millions of dollars in excessive fees to the issuer and an affiliate of the issuer in breach of limits on those fees set forth in the Supplemental Indentures. The court held that because plaintiff had not pled that it had met any of the conditions precedent to suit required by the no-action clause, the court dismissed plaintiff's claims. View "RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Education Loan Trust IV, et al." on Justia Law

This action involved a challenge to the termination of plaintiff's employment with the city. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, claiming that the city wrongfully terminated her employment based on her alleged failure to comply with the city's residency requirement. The court found that the relief sought by plaintiff fell outside the limited jurisdiction of the court where plaintiff failed to state a colorable claim for equitable relief and that the true substance of the relief she sought was a writ of certiorari. Therefore, the court dismissed plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Gladney v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

Gibraltar brought this action against Boston Private for specific performance of Boston Private's obligations under the tax allocation provision of the stock purchase agreement between the parties. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings under Court of Chancery Rule 12(c) on the question of how the tax payment provided for in the Stock Purchase Agreement should be calculated. In support of their respective motions, both parties argue that Section 5.5(d) of the Stock Purchase Agreement was unambiguous and that their respective interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. The court held that the relevant portion of Section 5.5(d) was ambiguous. Since each party had advanced a reading of Section 5.5(d) that was reasonable, neither party had met its burden of demonstrating that its interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings was denied. View "Gibraltar Private Bank & Trust Co. v. Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

This action involved a challenge to the decision by a purchaser to terminate a share purchase agreement and related consulting services agreement based on the purchaser's contention that certain conditions precedent to closing those agreements had not been met by the seller. Purchaser brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, seeking a determination that it properly terminated the share purchase and consulting services agreements and was entitled to the return of its down payment on the purchase price from escrow. The court found that the agreements between the parties unambiguously provided that the Development Fees were contingent on the commencement of actual development of the projects and that the purchaser was under no obligation to develop the projects. Therefore, the court granted purchaser's motion for partial summary judgment on that issue and held that seller was not entitled to any Development Fees as a result of purchaser's decision to terminate the transaction. View "Invenergy Solar Dev. LLC v. Gonergy Caribbean Sarl, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated as a partner of Deloitte LLP and Deloitte Tax LLP after he pled guilty to a criminal charge relating to allegedly stalking and harassing an ex-lover. Plaintiff claimed that Deloitte management wrongfully placed him on unpaid leave, recognized their error by reinstating his salary, yet continued to deny him his right to participate in the partnerships' business. The court granted summary judgment against plaintiff on the claim for breach of the partnership agreement; on his wrongful disassociation claim; on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim; on the Delaware Wage Payment and Collection Act claim; and on the breach of the duty of loyalty claim. The court also held that plaintiff's final complaint seeking specific performance was rendered moot when plaintiff was involuntarily terminated. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all counts of the complaint. View "Klig v. Deloitte LLP, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff asserted wide-ranging claims against defendant and its managing member after plaintiff and defendant agreed to combine their investment management operations into a single firm. After coming to believe that defendant was engaged in fraud, plaintiff terminated the arrangement. In a formal termination agreement, plaintiff agreed to pay certain enumerated expenses and the parties granted each other expansive global releases. The court held that, on its face, the broad and unambiguous language of the General Release encompassed all of the claims asserted in the Complaint. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted. View "Seven Investments, LLC, et al. v. AD Capital, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned a contractual dispute among the parties to an indemnification agreement incident to a merger. Plaintiffs asserted claims for indemnification and defendants disputed whether the Indemnification Agreement covered those claims. As to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court found that the Indemnification Agreement was ambiguous in certain important respects and that there were genuine issues of fact regarding the parties' intent as to the relevant indemnification clauses. Therefore, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but granted limited relief under Rule 56(d) regarding defendants' laches argument. View "ClubCorp, Inc. v. Pinehurst, LLC and Putterboy Ltd." on Justia Law

This case involved a claim for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that stemmed from a dispute regarding assets of IFCT, a now defunct tech startup company founded by Stephen Marsh to develop potentially revolutionary micro fuel cell technology. The crux of plaintiff's argument was that the Director Defendants conducted an unfair and disloyal bidding process, whereby they favored the Echelon-backed bid and refused to follow up on or negotiate with other superior bids. As a result, IFCT missed its chance to sell its assets at the peak of their value and was forced to sell its assets at a discount in bankruptcy. Given that the Director Defendants have conceded the applicability of entire fairness review and given the fact-intensive nature of that review, the court found that the Director Defendants have not met their burden at this stage to achieve summary judgment against Encite. The court also found that material facts remained as to the liability of Echelon for aiding and abetting the alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the Director Defendants and therefore, the court denied Echelon's motion for summary judgment on that claim. The court finally found that material facts also remained regarding Echelon's third party claims, and so denied Marsh's motion for summary judgment. View "Encite, LLC v. Soni, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over earn-out payments related to a merger between Viacom and Harmonix where plaintiff was one of the selling stockholders of Harmonix. Plaintiff sued on behalf of the selling stockholders, alleging that Viacom and Harmonix purposefully renegotiated the distribution contract with EA so as to reduce the earn-out payments payable to the Harmonix stockholders, and thus breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the Merger Agreement. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim and held that it would be inequitable for the court to imply a duty on Viacom and Harmonix's part to share with the selling stockholders the benefits of a renegotiated contract addressing EA's right to distribute Harmonix products after the expiration of the earn-out period. View "Winshall v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This matter came before the court on the basis of two competing motions related to a petition for the appointment of a receiver under 8 Del. C. 279 for Kraft-Murphy Company, Inc., a defunct Delaware corporation that had been dissolved for more than twelve years. The first motion was a motion to perfect service on the company brought by petitioners, who were claimants in various asbestos-related tort suits filed against the company in various jurisdictions in the mid-Atlantic region. The second motion was a motion to dismiss, filed by the company's insurers on behalf of the company. The court held that service of process could be perfected on the dissolved corporation and that petitioners conceivably could be able to show that a receiver should be appointed for the corporation to enable it to respond to claims brought against it, because the corporation's informal plan of dissolution contemplated using its insurance contracts for that purpose. Therefore, the court granted petitioners' motion to perfect service and denied the company's motion to dismiss. View "IMO Krafft-Murphy Co., Inc." on Justia Law