Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

The Court of Chancery granted Plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a letter of request to obtain the assistance of the central authority in Switzerland to obtain electronic data that Swiss investigators seized from the law office of defendant Dieter Neupert while investigating whether Neupert falsified evidence in a Switzerland civil proceeding, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to relief.In granting the motion, the Court of Chancery held that Plaintiff showed that issuance of the letter of request was warranted. Specifically, the Court concluded that Plaintiff met her burden of convincing the issuing court to ask a foreign court for assistance by showing that the letter of request was targeted and appropriate, that it would be difficult to obtain the information through other means, that the crime/fraud exception to privilege issues applied, and that Neupert would not produce the discovery materials if he had them. View "In re Cote d'Azur Estate Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Selling Stockholders' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings in this action brought after Corporation sold assets to Buyer and Buyer placed a portion of the consideration in escrow to fund any purchase price adjustment and to secure indemnification obligations, holding that there was no contractual basis for maintaining the funds in escrow.The asset purchase agreement in this case appointed Corporation's former CEO as the sellers' representative for purposes of making decisions about the escrowed funds, but the period for holding the escrowed funds had expired, and no claims against the escrowed funds remained outstanding. Selling Stockholders' filed this action against the former CEO asserting a series of claims designed to compel the release of the escrowed funds. The Court of Chancery granted relief, holding (1) the former CEO must exercise his discretionary authority over the release of the escrowed funds, but he must exercise that authority consistent with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (2) the order implementing this ruling will provide for the release of funds from escrow on a date not earlier than sixty days after the judgment becomes final. View "American Healthcare Administrative Services, Inc. v. Aizen" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted in part a motion for emergency post-judgment relief filed by Stream TV Networks, Inc. seeking an order canceling Hawk Investment Holding, Ltd.'s ownership of 1,000 shares of Technovative Media Inc.'s common stock, holding that Hawk and SeeCubic, Inc. engaged in contumacious conduct warranting relief.In this action, Stream argued that SeeCubic and Hawk acted in concert to transfer one hundred percent of the shares at issue from SeeCubic to Hawk and that this conduct was contumacious because the court had made clear in several rulings that SeeCubic was required to transfer its assets to Stream. The Court of Chancery held (1) SeeCubic and Hawk engaged in contumacious conduct, and Shad Stastney pulled the strings; and (2) as a remedy, this Court cancels Hawk's purported ownership of the shares and vested ownership in Stream. View "In re Stream TV Networks, Inc. Omnibus Agreement Litigation" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Court of Appeals suggested reconsidering the holding of CompoSecure, LLC v. CardUX, LLC (CompoSecure II), 206 A.3d 807 (Del. 2018), and permitting a court of equity to consider equitable defenses to a breach of contract claim even when the parties have used the word "void" to describe the consequence of contractual noncompliance.Defendant, a co-founder and member of XRI Investment Holdings LLC (XRI), formed GH Blue Holdings, LLC as a single-member LLC and then transferred all of his Class B units in XRI to Blue (the Blue Transfer). Defendant sought to comply with a provision in the LLC agreement that governed XRI's internal affairs that generally prohibited members from transferring their member interests by evoking an exception for a transfer to a "Permitted Transferee." XRI alleged that the Blue Transfer was void ab initio and never became effective, and Defendant responded that XRI's claim was barred by the equitable defense of acquiescence. The Court of Chancery held (1) there was no impediment to a defendant raising a defense of acquiescence in response to a legal claim; and (2) this decision sets out the rationale for a court to reconsider the holding in CompoSecure II so that the Delaware Supreme Court may consider it in connection with any appeal. View "XRI Investment Holdings LLC v. Holifield" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held that the petition in this case alleging that Respondent, a former teacher, befriended and manipulated a woman, now deceased, through coercion into receiving millions of dollars of the woman's inheritances should be dismissed in full, with prejudice.Petitioner filed a verified petition to, among other things, invalidate will and trust agreements, for breach of a fiduciary duty, and demand for accounting. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding (1) most of Petitioner's claims were either expressly time barred or sought a collateral attack on the incontestable final wishes of the decedent and that there was no viable basis for tolling the applicable limitations; and (2) Petitioner did not have standing to assert her remaining claims. View "Rambo v. Fischer" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery held Gregory Holifield violated an agreement by forming GH Blue Holdings, LLC (Blue) as a single-member LLC and then transferring all of his Class B units in XRI Investment Holdings, LLC (XRI), of which he was a co-founder and member, to Blue (the Blue Transfer) was void while the law required this result, it was contrary to the equities of the case.The LLC agreement that governed XRI's internal affairs (the LLC agreement) contained a provision generally prohibiting members from transferring their member interests (the No Transfer Provision) and that any such transfer is void. XRI asserted that the Blue Transfer was void ab initio and never became effective, and Holifield responded that XRI's claim was barred by the equitable defense of acquiescence. The Court of Chancery agreed with Holifield, holding Holifield satisfied all of the requirements to prove the defense of acquiescence. In this decision, the Court set out rationale to support an approach to the issue that does not currently reflect Delaware law and ordered the parties to submit a final order as to form. View "XRI Investment Holdings LLC v. Holifield" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery denied Jessica Puathasnanon's motion to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), holding that Puathasnanon was subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware for purposes of the claims asserted in this case.Hudson Vegas Investment SPV, LLC sued various defendants, including Puathasnanon, the general counsel and chief legal officer of P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC, asserting that Puathasnanon breached the fiduciary duties she owed to P3 and its members. Puathasnanon filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over her. The Court of Chancery denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Puathasnanon comported with minimum standards of due process. View "In re P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the action generally lacked an actual controversy and Plaintiffs sought what amounted to an advisory opinion and that the single portion of the dispute that appeared ripe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.In their complaint, Plaintiffs disputed a company's interpretation of certain provisions in an LLC agreement, The first count was a breach of contract claim seeking a determination regarding the construction of the LLC agreement, and the other count was also styled as a breach of contract claim seeking a declaration that restrictive covenants in certain sections of the LLC agreement were overbroad and unenforceable under Delaware law. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that no justiciable controversy existed. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding (1) the claim in count one was unripe, and the claim in count two did not present a justiciable dispute; and (2) the purchase notice claim in count one is dismissed without prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Klein v. ECG Topco Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents and confirmed a May 10, 2021 arbitration award, holding that this court was obliged to grant Respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment to confirm the award.Respondent commenced an arbitration proceeding against Petitioner asserting several claims relating to amendments to the parties' LLC agreement. After the arbitrator issued decisions, Petitioner filed a petition to vacate the award in part. Respondent and affiliated entities filed a counterclaim to confirm the arbitration award. All parties moved for summary judgment. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents and confirmed the arbitration award, holding that Petitioner's challenges to the award failed. View "Polychain Capital LP v. Pantera Venture Fund II LP" on Justia Law

In this dispute over whether homeowners may park a commercial van at and on their property in Bear, Delaware, the Court of Chancery held that the van was expressly permitted and that judgment should be entered in favor of the homeowners.Plaintiff was responsible for maintaining a private open space within a development. Property within the development was subject to restrictions set forth in a declaration of restrictions and an amendment to the declaration. Defendants were accused of violating a restriction on prohibited vehicles. Plaintiff filed the underlying complaint seeking a mandatory injunction to remove Defendants' van from the property. The Court of Chancery held that judgment should be entered in Defendants' favor because the van was expressly permitted under the amendment. View "Estates of Red Lion Maintenance Corp. v. Broome" on Justia Law