Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

This action involved a dispute between certain members of two Delaware real estate holding companies, Defendant Companies and the Companies' manager, Rubin Schron. Plaintiffs, MICH and SEEVA Entites, originally brought an action against Schron and Schron-affiliated entities in New York (the MICH/SEEVA action) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and of the Companies' operating agreements. In response, Schron filed an opposing action in New York against the MICH and SEEVA entities' majority owners and controllers, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. The New York court dismissed the MICH/SEEVA action, holding that the operating agreements required all claims against the Companies to be brought in Delaware. Plaintiffs then filed this action, which Schron moved to stay or dismiss. The Chancery Court granted Defendants' motion to stay this action in favor of Schron's first-filed New York action. Plaintiffs then filed combined motions for reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal. The Chancery Court held that, with the exception of Plaintiffs' claim regarding Defendants' withholding of certain distributions allegedly owed to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that relief was warranted. View "MICH II Holdings LLC v. Schron" on Justia Law

Central Mortgage and Morgan Stanley entered into a contract concerning the purchase of servicing rights for loans that Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the agencies) and private investors. Subsequently, many of the loans for which Morgan Stanley sold the servicing rights began to fall delinquent. The agencies exercised their contract right to put delinquent agency loans back to Central Mortgage. Central Mortgage then filed a complaint against Morgan Stanley for breach of contract. The Chancery Court granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were legally sufficient to withstand the motion. Central Mortgage then filed an amended complaint to add new claims for additional agency loans (new loans) that had been put back by the agencies and to challenge the private loans. Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Chancery Court (1) denied the motion to dismiss to the extent that it rehashed theories that the Court and Supreme Court already considered in the context of its original motion to dismiss; but (2) granted the motion to dismiss the claims related to the new loans because those claims were barred by Delaware's statute of limitations. View "Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

At an L.O.M. stockholders’ meeting, stockholders raised concerns about sufficiency of notice, accuracy of proxy materials, and lack of current financial information. In response to a stockholder’s request, the President of L.O.M., Matthews, adjourned the meeting. Matthews and “numerous stockholders” departed. L.O.M.’s counsel then announced that the meeting had not adjourned and that a recess was being taken. A director then purported to preside over a resumed meeting, at which challenged directors were allegedly elected. The challenged directors took a number of actions, including approving L.O.M.’s 2012 stock option plan and firing Matthews. Defendants assert that after the meeting resumed, votes were counted, and challenged directors were elected by about 56% of outstanding shares; after the meeting, the challenged directors sent the stockholders a letter that informed the stockholders of the meeting’s results. In an action to determine the composition of the board, the chancellor denied a motion to dismiss. The chancellor acknowledged sympathy for defendants’ “real argument,” that in attempting to ratify the vote for the challenged directors, a majority of shares outstanding have, in effect, been voted for the challenged directors and that adjournment of the meeting was simply an attempt by Matthews to preserve himself in office. View "Gentili v. L.O.M. Med. Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

WenDover, is a Delaware corporation that operates a Wendy franchise in Rehoboth Beach. Defendant RMLP owns the Rehoboth Mall Shopping Center, where the restaurant is located. Heartland leased land from the RMLP and then subleased the land to WenDover. In 2006, the parties disagreed whether Heartland had properly exercised the lease’s second renewal term. To resolve that dispute, Heartland agreed to pay the third renewal term’s rental rate during the second renewal term, and RMLP forgave any noncompliance with the renewal provisions of the lease. RMLP contends that Heartland did not provide notice and exercise the option for the third term, informed Heartland that Heartland was occupying the leasehold under an at-will tenancy and demanded that Heartland vacate. Heartland sought to enjoin RMLP from seeking eviction from the Justice of the Peace Court. The chancellor determined that the court lacked jurisdiction over what “is essentially a real estate possession action,” over which the legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts.View "Heartland DE Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd P'ship" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought appraisal of their shares in CKx, under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. CKx was acquired by an affiliate of Apollo through a 2011 merger. Fox Broadcasting is not a party to the litigation and was not involved in the merger, but has an agreement with a subsidiary of CKx, 19TV, for the right to broadcast the American Idol television program, which provided substantial revenues to CKx before the merger. Petitioners moved for an order compelling Fox to produce deposition testimony as well as several categories of documents relating to American Idol, Fox’s contracts and contract negotiations with 19TV and FremantleMedia . The chancellor denied the motion except as to the categories of documents and deposition testimony that Fox has agreed to produce. With respect to a request that would require Fox to produce documents relating to Fox’s internal valuation and financial information regarding its negotiations with CKx in connection with an agreement to broadcast American Idol, the court stated that the marginal relevance of the information is outweighed by the potential harm the disclosure of that information would cause Fox and the presence of non-confidential, more probative information already in the record. View "Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx Inc." on Justia Law

IQ Holdings, Inc. (IQ Holdings) filed a petition seeking appraisal of its shares in American Commercial Lines Inc. (American). Both of the parties engaged financial experts. IQ Holdings retained David Fuller, and American retained Melissa Knoll. Believing that IQ Holdings improperly revised and supplemented its expert report after the discovery cutoff, American moved to strike the revised portions and to preclude Fuller from testifying about them. The Court of Chancery concluded that Fuller's revised portion of his report was excluded and he was precluded from testifying about it, and ordered that IQ Holdings serve a revised expert report showing how returning the analysis to the original version changed Fuller's valuation. View "IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Commercial Lines Inc." on Justia Law

Travelers, an insurer, was being sued for insurance benefits in a New Jersey court. Plaintiff there was a subsidiary of a defendant here, Sequa. Travelers sought specific performance of, and a declaratory judgment arising from, a release of claims by Sequa in favor of Travelers, made in connection with the settlement of coverage litigation in the Delaware Superior Court in 1997. The relief sought by Travelers here would relieve it from, or indemnify it for, liability in the coverage litigation being undertaken in New Jersey. Because the explicit language of the release excluded the sites for which plaintiff in the New Jersey action sought coverage, as a matter of contract law Travelers was not entitled to the specific performance or declaratory judgment it sought here. Accordingly, the court dismissed the matter. View "Travelers Casualty and Surety Co. v. Sequa Corp., et al." on Justia Law

In this derivative action, the parties sought judicial approval of a settlement. Defendants agreed to pay the Fund, on whose behalf the derivative claims were brought, and agreed not to pursue claims for indemnification against the Fund. Certain limited partners in the Fund, including the named plaintiffs, objected to the settlement consideration as inadequate. The court held that the settlement consideration fell within a range of fairness, albeit at the low end. Because the consideration fell within the range of fairness, the court will approve the settlement unless the objectors make the equivalent of a topping bid. View "Forsythe, et al. v. ESC Fund Management Co. (U.S.), Inc., et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when Martin Marietta sought to purchase all of Vulcan's outstanding shares (Exchange Offer). At issue was the meaning of confidentiality agreements entered into by both parties. The court found in favor of Vulcan on its counterclaims for breach of the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) (Count I), and the joint defense and confidentiality agreement (JDA)(Count II), and against Martin Marietta on its claim that it did not breach the NDA (Count I). Martin Marietta shall be enjoined for a period of four months from prosecuting a proxy contest, making an exchange or tender offer, or otherwise taking steps to acquire control of Vulcan shares or assets. During that period, it is also enjoined from any further violations of the NDA and JDA. Vulcan shall submit a conforming final judgment within five days, upon approval as to form by Martin Marietta. View "Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought their Verified Complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. J.P.Morgan also asserted a claim for attorneys' fees and costs under an option agreement that J.P. Morgan and defendant entered into, which was the contract central to the dispute. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that J.P. Morgan has failed to state a claim that defendant breached the express terms of the Option Agreement and therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted as to Count I. Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count II because J.P. Morgan's allegations, taken together, were sufficient to state a claim of the implied covenant. Finally, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied as to Count III where J.P. Morgan could eventually be the prevailing party in this action. View "JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. American Century Co." on Justia Law