Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

Quandrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. owned debt securities issued by Athilon Capital Corp. a Delaware corporation. Quadrant asserted derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the members of Athilon’s board of directors, contending that Athilon was insolvent. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) for a creditor to have standing to maintain a derivative action, the corporation on whose behalf the creditor sues must be insolvent at the time of suit and continuously thereafter; and (2) when defining solvency, a plaintiff must prove that the corporation has no reasonable prospect of returning to solvency. The Court of Chancery denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding (1) to bring a derivative action, a creditor (i) must plead and later prove that the corporation was insolvent at the time the suit was filed, and (ii) must plead and later prove insolvency under the traditional balance sheet or cash flow tests; and (2) there was evidence which supported a reasonable inference that Athilon was insolvent at the time Quadrant filed suit. View "Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin" on Justia Law

At issue in this derivative action were awards of restricted stock units (RSUs) that were granted to non-employee directors of Citrix Systems, Inc. (Citrix) (the RSU Awards). The majority of the directors’ compensation consisted of these RSU Awards, which the board’s compensation committee granted under Citrix’s Equity Incentive Plan (Plan). Citrix stockholders approved the Plan. Plaintiff-stockholder brought this action contending that the RSU Awards were, when combined with the cash payments that Citrix’s non-employee directors receive, “excessive” in comparison with the compensation received by directors at certain of Citrix’s peers. Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I), waste of corporate assets (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to make a pre-suit demand upon Citrix’s board. The Court of Chancery (1) denied Defendants’ Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 motion, as demand was futile; and (2) granted Defendants’ Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to Count II but denied it as to Counts I and III, concluding that it was reasonably conceivable that the non-employee directors’ total compensation was not entirely fair to Citrix and that Defendants were unjustly enriched by the RSU Awards. View "Calma v. Templeton" on Justia Law

In 2012, Well Union Capital Limited (WU Parent) and Tom James Company (James) formed Carlisle Etcetera LLC (Carlisle). A James executive was appointed as Carlisle’s CEO, and through the CEO, James controlled Carlisle’s day-to-day operations. After Carlisle was formed, WU Parent transferred its member interest to a wholly owned subsidiary called Well Union U.S. Holdings, Inc. (WU Sub). Under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the LLC Act), the transfer rendered WU Sub an assignee, rather than a member. When the relationship between US Parent and James deteriorated, both sides agreed that one needed to buy out the other, but they could not agree on a buyout procedure or price. During negotiations over the buyout, James sought to use its privileged position to extract concessions from WU Sub. WU Sub petitioned the Court of Chancery to dissolve Carlisle. James filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because WU Sub was an assignee rather than a member, it lacked standing to petition for statutory dissolution under the LLC Act. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding (1) WU Parent and WU Sub lacked standing to petition for statutory dissolution under the LLC Act; but (2) WU Sub had standing to seek dissolution in equity. View "In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC" on Justia Law

3850 & 3860 Colonial Blvd. LLC acquired an interest in Rubicon Media, LLC, a limited liability company controlled by Christopher Griffin. Griffin carried out a recapitalization of Rubicon LLC, which gave rise to Colonial’s principal claims. Rubicon LLC’s operating agreement required arbitration. Griffin later converted Rubicon LLC into Rubicon Media, Inc. At issue in this case was whether Colonial was obligated to arbitrate or whether creation of Rubicon Media as the LLC’s successor - with a charter providing exclusively for litigation - eliminated any right or duty to arbitrate. In a letter opinion, the Court of Chancery stayed proceedings pending arbitration, specifically awaiting resolution of the question of substantive arbitrability. Colonial sought certification of an interlocutory appeal of that order. The Court rejected Colonial’s application for certification of an interlocutory appeal, holding that there was an arguable basis for arbitration that raised a question for resolution in the arbitration forum. View "3850 & 3860 Colonial Blvd., LLC v. Griffin" on Justia Law

American Messaging Services, LLC (AMS) purchased an ownership interest in DocHalo, LLC. The parties entered into an agreement establishing the terms of their business relationship. After AMS discovered that DocHalo had contacted some of AMS’s sales personnel about joining DocHalo and had unilaterally reached out to some of AMS’s customers, AMS filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misappropriation of trade secrets, and tortious interference with contractual relations. AMS sought a temporary restraining order seeking DocHalo from contacting its customers and sales personnel. The Court of Chancery denied the motion, holding that while AMS established colorable claims against DocHalo, it did not appear to face imminent and irreparable harm that would justify extraordinary relief. View "Am. Messaging Servs., LLC v. DocHalo, LLC" on Justia Law

While boating, Defendant discovered a nearly fifteen-acre parcel of land that was landlocked, wooded, and partially submerged. The tax records for the parcel listed it as either “unknown owner” or “owner unknown.” Defendant determined to claim the property and began to use the property by visiting it regularly and paying taxes on the property. Plaintiffs later filed this action alleging that Defendant interfered with the quiet enjoyment of their property and slandered their title and seeking a declaration that they were the legal and rightful owners of the land. Defendant counterclaimed, requesting a declaratory judgment that he had acquired the disputed lands by adverse possession. The Court of Chancery granted judgment for Defendant, holding that Defendant established title to the property by adverse possession. View "Tumulty v. Schreppler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four Delaware-domiciled captive insurance companies. The State Insurance Commissioner prosecuted their claims as their receiver in liquidation, alleging fraudulent conduct on the part of the companies’ president, breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the other directors of the corporation, and, as to the companies’ auditors and their administrative management company, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence. The Court of Chancery dismissed in part the claims against the auditors and their company, holding (1) the doctrine of in pari delicto applies in this case and effectively bars the relevant claims against those defendants; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and negligence are dismissed on grounds of in pari delicto, but the fiduciary duty exception to in pari delicto covers Plaintiffs’ claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims for aiding and abetting against each of the auditors and the administrative management company is denied, except as they relate to the auditor that was retained second. View "Hon. Karen Stewart v. Wilmington Trust SP Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant First Aviation Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, completed a 10,000-to-1 reverse stock split, which eliminated the interests of Plaintiff, a former stockholder of First Aviation. Four days later, the First Aviation directors adopted a non-reciprocal fee-shifting bylaw purporting to create fee exposure for former stockholders of the company and their attorneys in any challenge to the reverse stock split. Ten days later, Plaintiff brought this action against First Aviation and its directors (collectively, Defendants) on behalf of himself and a class of former First Aviation stockholders who had been similarly cashed out, alleging that the reverse stock split was unfair. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to challenge the bylaw. Defendants argued that the bylaw was enforceable in this case. Plaintiff moved for partial judgment on the pleadings that the bylaw did not apply here. The Court of Chancery granted Plaintiff’s motion, holding that because the bylaw was adopted after Plaintiff was cashed out of First Aviation by operation of the reverse stock split, the bylaw did not apply to this case. View "Strougo v. Hollander" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff retained Law Firm in connection with an action to inspect the books and records of certain defendants. Law Firm served as counsel in this litigation through the filing of claims against other defendants. In 2011, Law Firm withdrew as counsel. When some defendants prevailed at trial, the Court concluded that Law Firm should be awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses. Law Firm then moved to intervene, attaching a petition for a charging lien based on $766,166 in unpaid fees and expenses incurred in representing Plaintiff during the earlier stages of this litigation. The Court of Chancery granted the motion for leave to intervene, holding that Law Firm had an interest relating to the subject of the action, and Law Firm’s application was timely. View "Sutherland v. Sutherland" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned an underlying breach of fiduciary duty case that was coordinated with an appraisal proceeding, both arising out of a take-private transaction involving Dole Food Company, Inc. (Dole). During the proceedings, Defendants identified a corporation as their expert witness on the subject of Dole’s value at the time of the transaction. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that an expert witness must be a biological person. The Court of Chancery agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that an expert witness must be a biological person, and therefore, Defendants could not rely on the corporation that they designated to serve as their expert witness. View "In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law