Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought this action opposing the use of portions of a former industrial park in the City of Lewes, now owned by the state. This action involved a lease of a portion of that property to the City and a sublease from Lewes to a non-profit that maintained a dog park on the property. At a regularly scheduled city council meeting, the Lewes City Council voted to approve an amendment to the sublease to the non-profit, which added an access road to the sublease. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged numerous violations of the Delaware Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Court of Chancery granted the motion to dismiss of the Mayor, the City Council, and the City, holding that a violation of FOIA did not occur here. View "Lechliter v. Becker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a bylaw adopted by Paylocity Holding Corporation purporting to shift to a stockholder who files an internal corporate claim outside of Delaware without the company’s consent attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by the company in connection with the claim if the stockholder does not achieve the full remedy sought. Here, a Paylocity stockholder sought a declaration that the bylaw was invalid under Sections 109(b) and 102(b)(6) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as unripe and for failure to state a claim for relief. The Court of Chancery held (1) Plaintiff’s claims are ripe for review; (2) Plaintiff’s challenge under Section 109(b) states a claim for relief; and (3) Plaintiff’s remaining two claims are dismissed because Plaintiff did not demonstrate that the bylaw violates Section 102(b)(6) and because Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief with regard to these claims. View "Solak v. Paylocity Holding Corp." on Justia Law

Charles and Melissa Dalton obtained a loan from Household Finance Corporation II that was secured by a mortgage on their property. The Daltons received a trial period plan pursuant to a Trial Period Plan Agreement. The Daltons’ loan was later sold to LSF9 Master Participation Trust, and the servicing of the Daltons’ loan was transferred to Caliber Home Loans, Inc. The Daltons filed this action against LSF9 and Caliber alleging, inter alia, breach of the Trial Period Plan Agreement and seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining LSF9 and Caliber from terminating the Daltons’ loan modification. The Court of Chancery dismissed all claims against LSF9 and Caliber, holding (1) LSF9 and Caliber were not parties nor successors in interest to the Trial Period Plan Agreement; (2) LSF9 and Caliber were not parties to the consent orders between Household Finance and the United States Department of the Treasury; (3) the Daltons failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment; and (4) the Daltons failed to allege a reasonable probability of success on the merits or imminent threat of irreparable injury. View "Dalton v. Household Finance Corp., II" on Justia Law

This lawsuit involved a loan agreement between Lender and Borrowers. The agreement gave Lender an option to purchase the collateral for the loan - the famous ex-Presidential Yacht Sequoia. A valuation of the Sequoia for purposes of securing the loan was established via fraud on the part of Borrowers. The claims and counterclaims arising out of the loan agreement were eventually resolved by a settlement entered as a court order. The only issue remaining for the Court of Chancery was to oversee the computation of the amount due Borrowers from Lender should Lender elect to acquire the Sequoia. Lender agreed to a minimum option price of zero dollars. The Court of Chancery found the option price to be zero dollars. View "The Sequoia Presidential Yacht Group LLC v. FE Partners LLC" on Justia Law

The beneficial owner of a Delaware statutory trust sought to inspect certain of the trust’s books and records. The trust denied the beneficial owner’s request, asserting that the form of the request and the motivations underlying the request were improper. The beneficial owner filed a complaint asserting both a contractual demand and a statutory demand. The Court of Chancery granted the beneficial owner’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the beneficial owner was entitled to inspect, examine, and copy the requested information under its contractual demand. View "Grand Acquisition, LLC v. Passco Indian Springs DST" on Justia Law

After a beneficial owner (Grand Acquisition) of a Delaware statutory trust sought to inspect certain of the trust's books and records, the trust (Passco Trust) denied the request, arguing that the form of the request and the motivations underlying the request both were improper. The bulk of the parties’ dispute centers on whether the trust agreement incorporates the statutory requirements of 12 Del. C. 3819 and, if so, whether the beneficial owner has satisfied those requirements. In this case, the court concluded that Grand Acquisition is entitled to the requested information under its contractual demand where the owners' right to books and records under the Trust Agreement is not subject to the Delaware Statutory Trust Act's, 12 Del. C. 3801-3826, preconditions and defenses, the owners' right to books and records under the Trust Agreement includes the requested information, and Passco Trust has failed to prove its implied improper purpose defense. Accordingly, The court granted Grand Acquisition's motion for summary judgment and denied Passco Trust's motion for summary judgment. View "Grand Aquisition, LLC v. Passco Indian Springs DST" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former stockholders of Auspex, filed a putative class action to challenge the propriety of the merger with Teva Pharmaceuticals and seek post-closing damages, alleging that the members of Auspex's board of directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting senior management to conduct a flawed sales process that ultimately netted stockholders inadequate consideration for their shares. The directors have moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that, even accepting plaintiffs' well-pled facts as true, defendants are entitled to invoke the irrebuttable business judgment rule. In this case, plaintiffs have not pled facts that would allow a reasonable inference that the merger involved a controlling stockholder, much less that a controlling stockholder pushed Auspex into a conflicted transaction in which the controller received nonratable benefits. They are left, then, to overcome the cleansing effect of stockholder approval, which in this case was disinterested, uncoerced and fully informed. View "Larkin v. Shah" on Justia Law

This letter opinion addressed Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiffs’ amended third-party complaint. The Third-Party Defendants advanced four bases on which the amended complaint should be dismissed, including lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, and an unreasonable delay in bringing the amended complaint. The Court of Chancery granted the Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the Third-Party Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the Third-Party Plaintiffs failed to identify a tolling doctrine or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to avoid application of laches. View "CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Castle" on Justia Law

Diamond State Tire, Inc. (Diamond State) has been in business since 1989, and its customers and vendors often refer to it as Diamond Tire. Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care LLC (Diamond Town) opened for business in 2015. Diamond State sued Diamond Town, alleging that Diamond Town violated Delaware’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the Act) by operating under a business name that creates a “likelihood of confusion” between the two businesses. The Court of Chancery entered judgment in favor of Diamond Town, concluding that Diamond State failed to demonstrate a violation of the Act. View "Diamond State Tire, Inc. v. Diamond Town Tire Pros & Auto Care, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the fair value of stock of ISN Software Corp. (Respondent) held by two minority stockholders, Polaris and Ad-Venture, (collectively, Petitioners) at the time of a merger by which the controller cashed out some, but not all, of the stock held by the minority. The Court of Chancery held (1) the method used by the controller to determine the fair value of the stock is unreliable; (2) a discounted cash flow analysis is the most reliable indicator of fair value; and (3) upon consideration of the expert opinions provided by Petitioners and Respondent, the statutory fair value is $98,783 per share. View "In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig." on Justia Law