Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff entered into a lease with Defendant containing optional renewal terms. The parties disputed whether the option was properly exercised. Defendant then informed Plaintiff that if it failed to vacate the leasehold, Defendant would pursue legal action. Plaintiff brought this action to forestall that eventuality. At issue in this case was whether the Court of Chancery can exercise jurisdiction over what is essentially a real estate possession action, notwithstanding that the Legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts. The Court of Chancery granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding (1) the Court does not have jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, to enjoin Defendant from seeking relief from the Justice of the Peace Court in this matter where that court has exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) a claim does not exist in equity to nullify Defendant's contractual rights arising from Plaintiffs' purported failure to timely exercise an option. View "Heartland Del. Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute between certain members of two Delaware real estate holding companies, Defendant Companies and the Companies' manager, Rubin Schron. Plaintiffs, MICH and SEEVA Entites, originally brought an action against Schron and Schron-affiliated entities in New York (the MICH/SEEVA action) alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and of the Companies' operating agreements. In response, Schron filed an opposing action in New York against the MICH and SEEVA entities' majority owners and controllers, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. The New York court dismissed the MICH/SEEVA action, holding that the operating agreements required all claims against the Companies to be brought in Delaware. Plaintiffs then filed this action, which Schron moved to stay or dismiss. The Chancery Court granted Defendants' motion to stay this action in favor of Schron's first-filed New York action. Plaintiffs then filed combined motions for reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal. The Chancery Court held that, with the exception of Plaintiffs' claim regarding Defendants' withholding of certain distributions allegedly owed to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' motion should be denied because Plaintiffs did not demonstrate that relief was warranted. View "MICH II Holdings LLC v. Schron" on Justia Law

WenDover, is a Delaware corporation that operates a Wendy franchise in Rehoboth Beach. Defendant RMLP owns the Rehoboth Mall Shopping Center, where the restaurant is located. Heartland leased land from the RMLP and then subleased the land to WenDover. In 2006, the parties disagreed whether Heartland had properly exercised the lease’s second renewal term. To resolve that dispute, Heartland agreed to pay the third renewal term’s rental rate during the second renewal term, and RMLP forgave any noncompliance with the renewal provisions of the lease. RMLP contends that Heartland did not provide notice and exercise the option for the third term, informed Heartland that Heartland was occupying the leasehold under an at-will tenancy and demanded that Heartland vacate. Heartland sought to enjoin RMLP from seeking eviction from the Justice of the Peace Court. The chancellor determined that the court lacked jurisdiction over what “is essentially a real estate possession action,” over which the legislature has vested exclusive jurisdiction over such matters with the Justice of the Peace Courts.View "Heartland DE Inc. v. Rehoboth Mall Ltd P'ship" on Justia Law

This derivative action challenged a series of related-party transactions. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that laches barred the bulk of the claims. Defendants were partly right, laches barred the challenges to certain stock options granted in 2004 and 2005. Laches also barred a portion of the challenge to compensation received under certain employment agreements and rent-free sublease. With respect to these claims, the doctrine applied to the extent the compensation was paid and rent-free space provided before March 18, 2008. The doctrine did not apply to the extent that compensation was paid and rent-free space provided on or after March 18, 2008. On a final set of claims, the court granted plaintiffs leave to replead because although the complaint alleged facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling, the pleading failed to identify when plaintiffs subsequently found out about the self-dealing transactions. View "Buerger, et al. v. Apfel, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the State to challenge a demand for payment made by the State under Delaware's escheat law, 12 Del. C. 1101, et seq. The State countersued, seeking a declaration that the sums demanded from plaintiff were proper and authorized under the Statute. Both parties moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the rebates at issue fit comfortably within two of the "specifically enumerated" items of property listed in section 1198(11) and therefore granted the State's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and denied plaintiff's cross-motion. Although the pleadings did not paint a clear picture of the form in which the rebates were issued by plaintiff to its customers, plaintiff's counsel conceded at oral argument that the rebates were issued as either negotiable "checks" or "credits." As such, the rebates consisted of specifically enumerated items of property under section 1198(11), and the State's claims could not be barred by any statute of limitations. View "Staples, Inc. v. Cook, et al." on Justia Law

This action was before the court on a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin the consummation of a proposed restructuring of a mortgage loan secured by certain resorts properties in Mexico and the Bahamas. Holders of more senior participations claim that the proposed transaction unfairly benefited the junior holder at the expense of the more senior holders in direct contravention of the terms of the agreements controlling the debt. The senior holders further claimed that if the proposed transaction was allowed to close, they would suffer irreparable harm through the loss of certain rights and guaranties under the new terms of the loan. The court concluded that the senior holders have stated colorable claims and made a sufficient showing that they would suffer imminent harm if the proposed transaction were allowed to close. Further, the court found that this potential irreparable harm outweighed the harm that would result to the junior holders by delaying the closing for a few weeks until a preliminary injunction could be heard. Accordingly, the court granted the TRO. View "Trilogy Portfolio Co., LLC, et al. v. Brookfield Real Estate Financial Partners, et al." on Justia Law

This matter involved the adoption of a land use comprehensive plan by the Kent County Levy Court. Petitioners, landowners, argued that the ordinance adopting the plan worked a zoning change on their properties because, pursuant to the land use map incorporated in the plan, the density of the permissible development of the properties was significantly reduced. Petitioners alleged numerous violations of constitutional and statutory law arising of the alleged downzoning of the properties. The county moved to dismiss, arguing that the matter was not ripe for adjudication because the plan and land use map were planning documents only and did not change Petitioners' property rights. The Chancery Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding (1) because land use maps have the force of law, and the county may not permit development of the properties except in conformity with the new land use map, Petitioners had suffered a diminution in their ability to develop the properties, assuming the factual allegation of their petition were true; and (2) therefore, Petitioners' allegations were ripe for consideration. View "Farmers for Fairness v. Kent County Levy Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an attorney, brought this action pro se seeking reformation of a mortgage. Petitioner was not a party to the mortgage or the loan it secured; he had no interest in the underlying party; sued on his own name and not on behalf of either the borrower or the lender; and there were no defendants. Petitioner sought an order reforming a mortgage by substituting the correct legal description for the property, asserting that his potential exposure for negligence gave him a sufficient interest to bring the action. The court held that petitioner was a non-party to the contract and therefore, he lacked standing to seek reformation. View "In re Mortgage between Pamela S. Pantalone, as Borrower, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Lender" on Justia Law

This case involved a challenge to the New Castle County Council's approval of the record plan for a housing development. The development was the joint effort of two record owners of individual parcels: the limited liability companies, Robinson Investments, LLC, and Robinson Investments Two, LLC. Plaintiffs, however, did not name Robinson Investments, LLC, as a party, and defendants moved to dismiss because of plaintiffs' failure to join an indispensable party. Because of the time limitations embodied in 10 Del. C. 8126, joinder of Robinson Investments, LLC, was not precluded. Therefore, if Robinson Investments, LLC, was an indispensable party, the action would be dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the court found that Robinson Investments, LLC, was an indispensable party to the action and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Makitka, Jr., et al. v. New Castle County Council, et al." on Justia Law

This case involved the adoption and implementation of a redevelopment plan in South Wilmington known as the South Walnut Street Urban Renewal Plan (SWURP). Plaintiffs, property owners in the SWURP area, sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment finding that the SWURP and ordinances adopting the 2007 and 2009 amendments to the SWURP were legally invalid, and prohibiting their application. The City of Wilmington argued as a preliminary matter that there was no justiciable controversy, and moreover, even if there was a justiciable controversy, the SWURP was amended in 2009 and did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. The court concluded that, assuming that a justiciable controversy existed, the SWURP did not impose unlawful overlay zoning. Therefore, summary judgment was granted in favor of the city and plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Osbourne v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law