Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a company that was acquired for $18 per share in an all-cash merger. Five months earlier, the target company declined an offer of $24 per share from the same acquiror. Plaintiffs, former public stockholders of the target company, sued the company’s board of directors and financial advisor, alleging that the board breached its fiduciary duties in approving the merger and that the financial advisor aided and abetted the breaches. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the business judgment rule standard of review applied to Plaintiffs’ allegations and insulated the merger. View "In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Company completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Petitioners, owners of shares of common stock of the Company, seek appraisal. The court concluded that the fair value of the Company on the closing date was $17.62 per share; the legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until the date of payment; the parties shall cooperate on preparing a final order for the court; and, if there are additional issues for the court to resolve before a final order can be entered, the parties shall submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them and recommends a schedule for bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court level. View "In Re: Appraisal of Dell Inc." on Justia Law

The Company, a developmental biopharmaceutical company, which has researched and developed a drug called NORTHERA, filed a class action alleging breaches of fiduciary duty against defendants in connection with the sale of Chelsea to Lundbeck through a tender offer and short-form merger (the Transaction). Plaintiffs contend that the Board acted in bad faith by instructing its financial advisors to ignore one set of projections in opining on the fairness of the Transaction, and by choosing to disregard a second set of projections before recommending the Transaction to Chelsea’s stockholders. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Board, after deliberation and in consideration of the sale of the Company, instructed its advisors not to consider projections that its assets would increase in value, years in the future, on speculation that the FDA would approve one of its products for currently-prohibited uses, or would remove a competing drug from the market altogether. Both sets of projections involved contingencies over which the Company had no control, and which might never come to pass. Such actions do not, on their face, plead a conceivable breach of the Directors loyalty-based duty to act in good faith. No other grounds conceivably leading to a finding of bad faith are pled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l Ltd. Stockholders Litig." on Justia Law

Dell Inc. completed a merger that gave rise to appraisal rights. Fourteen appraisal petitioners were mutual funds sponsored by T. Rowe Price & Associates, Inc. (T. Rowe) or institutions that relied on T. Rowe to direct the voting of their shares (collectively, Petitioners). Petitioners held their shares through a custodial bank, which was a participant member in a trust company, which held Petitioners’ shares in the name of Cede & Co., which, for purposes of Delaware law, was the holder of record. Cede was constrained to vote Petitioners’ shares as T. Rowe directed and fulfilled its obligation through a chain of authorizations. Although T. Rowe opposed the merger, its voting system generated instructions to vote Petitioners’ shares in favor of it. Ultimately, Cede voted Petitioners’ shares in favor of the merger. Petitioners sought appraisal in favor of the merger. The Court of Chancery held (1) because the holder of record did not dissent as to the shares for which Petitioners sought appraisal, the dissenter requirement was not met of these shares; and (2) therefore, Petitioners’ shares did not qualify for appraisal, and Petitioners remained entitled to the merger consideration without an award of interest. View "In re Appraisal of Dell Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, El Paso Corporation (“El Paso Parent”) sold member interests in three limited liability companies to El Paso Pipeline Partners, LP (“El Paso MLP”). At the time of the sale, El Paso Parent controlled El Paso MLP through its ownership of El Paso Pipeline GP Company, LLC, the sole general partner of El Paso MLP (“El Paso GP”). In 2015, the Court of Chancery issued a post-trial decision concluding that El Paso GP breached the limited partnership agreement governing El Paso MLP by causing El Paso MLP to buy the member interests (the “Fall Dropdown”). In 2012, Plaintiff brought this action challenging the Fall Droptown. While the litigation was pending, Kinder Morgan, Inc., acquired El Paso Parent and therefore indirectly owned and controlled El Paso GP. After trial, Kinder Morgan, El Paso Parent, El Paso MLP, and El Paso GP consummated a merger that ended El Paso MLP’s separate existence as a publicly traded entity. El Paso GP moved to dismiss this litigation, arguing that because Plaintiff styled his claim as derivative the closing of the merger meant that this case must be dismissed. The Court of Chancery denied El Paso GP’s motion to dismiss, holding that the merger did not extinguish Plaintiff’s standing to pursue the claim, and therefore, this Court can implement the liability award. View "In re El Paso Pipeline Partners, L.P. Derivative Litig." on Justia Law

This action arose out of the stock-for-stock merger of Jefferies Group, Inc. and Leucadia National Corporation. After the transaction was announced, the first of seven actions challenging the proposed transactions as filed in New York state court. The case subsequently proceeded in Delaware. Before trial began, the parties reached an agreement-in-principle to settle the case. The settlement, which was formally approved by the Court of Chancery, resulted in a payment of $70 million to the Class. Delaware Counsel sought an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, and New York Plaintiffs filed a motion for a share of the fee award. The Court of Chancery (1) held that Delaware Counsel was entitled to a fee award of $21.5 million, which equated to 23.5 percent of the gross value of the settlement; and (2) denied the New York Plaintiffs’ motion for a share of the fee award in this action, holding that the New York Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their contribution to the results achieved in the Delaware action. View "In re Jefferies Group, Inc. Shareholders Litig." on Justia Law

After David H. Murdock, the CEO and controlling stockholder of Dole Food Company, Inc., acquired all the shares of Dole common stock that he did not already own, Petitioners pursued their statutory right to an appraisal of their shares of Dole common stock. During discovery, Dole sought information about any valuations of Dole common stock that Petitioners prepared, reviewed, or considered when buying to selling Dole common stock or when seeking appraisal. Petitioners objected to the document requests. Dole subsequently served notices of deposition for each Petitioner pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 30(b)(6) and identified the valuations as a topic of questioning. During the depositions, Petitioners’ counsel instructed the Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses not to testify about the valuations on the basis of relevance. Dole moved to compel production of the valuation-related information and for supplemental Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that, under the circumstances, Petitioners’ failure to provide the discovery was not substantially justified. View "In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co., challenged Optum Services, Inc’s acquisition by merger, via Audax Holdings, Inc., of Audax Health Solutions, Inc. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that certain provisions of the merger agreement were contrary to the Delaware General Corporation Law. Those provisions related to a release of claims, an indemnification requirement, and the appointment of a stockholder representative. The Court of Chancery granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the release of claims lacks any force because the buyer attempted to impose that obligation in a contract lacking consideration; (2) the indemnification provision violates 8 Del. Cas. 251; and (3) Plaintiff failed to brief the stockholder representative issue sufficiently to support its request for judgment as a matter of law. View "Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Audax Health Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

After TPC Group Inc. announced its acquisition by First Reserve Corporation, SK Capital Partners, and their affiliates (collectively, the PE Group), Plaintiffs, shareholders of TPC, brought a class action against TPC, the TPC’s board of directors, and the PE Group (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs’ claims were later mooted, and the Court of Chancery awarded attorneys’ fees for the disclosures resulting from Plaintiffs’ efforts. At issue before the Court was whether Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys’ fees for the increase in the merger price achieved between the commencement of this litigation and the acquisition’s closing under an amended merger agreement. The Court of Chancery denied Plaintiffs’ application for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses for the increase in the merger price, concluding that Plaintiffs did not cause the price increase in any way. View "In re TPC Group Inc. S’holders Litig." on Justia Law

In 2004, KKR & Co. LP (KKR) acquired KKR Financial Holdings LLC (KFN) in a stock-for-stock merger. Plaintiffs, stockholders of KFN, challenged the merger by filing a class action complaint, asserting breach of fiduciary duty claims against the members of the KFN board and KKR. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action for failure to state a claim for relief, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against KKR premised on the theory that KKR was a controlling stockholder of KFN failed, as KKR did not control the board of KFN when it approved the merger; and (2) Plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim against the directors of KFN failed because the board’s approval of the merger was subject to business judgment review. View "In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC Shareholder Litig." on Justia Law