Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs - shareholders in their individual capacities - filed a complaint alleging that Defendants breached the duty of loyalty by conducting a self-interested recapitalization. Monetary damages were not available to Plaintiffs, but the Court of Chancery granted Plaintiffs leave to petition the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses, noting its inherent equitable power to shift attorneys’ fees and its statutory authority to shift costs. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to an award of $2 million in attorneys’ fees and expenses, as such an award promotes meritorious litigation to address harm from disloyal acts and comports with equitable principles. View "In re Nine Systems Corp. S’holders Litig." on Justia Law

Quandrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. owned debt securities issued by Athilon Capital Corp. a Delaware corporation. Quadrant asserted derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the members of Athilon’s board of directors, contending that Athilon was insolvent. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) for a creditor to have standing to maintain a derivative action, the corporation on whose behalf the creditor sues must be insolvent at the time of suit and continuously thereafter; and (2) when defining solvency, a plaintiff must prove that the corporation has no reasonable prospect of returning to solvency. The Court of Chancery denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claims, holding (1) to bring a derivative action, a creditor (i) must plead and later prove that the corporation was insolvent at the time the suit was filed, and (ii) must plead and later prove insolvency under the traditional balance sheet or cash flow tests; and (2) there was evidence which supported a reasonable inference that Athilon was insolvent at the time Quadrant filed suit. View "Quadrant Structured Prods. Co., Ltd. v. Vertin" on Justia Law

At issue in this derivative action were awards of restricted stock units (RSUs) that were granted to non-employee directors of Citrix Systems, Inc. (Citrix) (the RSU Awards). The majority of the directors’ compensation consisted of these RSU Awards, which the board’s compensation committee granted under Citrix’s Equity Incentive Plan (Plan). Citrix stockholders approved the Plan. Plaintiff-stockholder brought this action contending that the RSU Awards were, when combined with the cash payments that Citrix’s non-employee directors receive, “excessive” in comparison with the compensation received by directors at certain of Citrix’s peers. Plaintiff asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I), waste of corporate assets (Count II), and unjust enrichment (Count III). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for failure to make a pre-suit demand upon Citrix’s board. The Court of Chancery (1) denied Defendants’ Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 motion, as demand was futile; and (2) granted Defendants’ Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to Count II but denied it as to Counts I and III, concluding that it was reasonably conceivable that the non-employee directors’ total compensation was not entirely fair to Citrix and that Defendants were unjustly enriched by the RSU Awards. View "Calma v. Templeton" on Justia Law

In 2012, Well Union Capital Limited (WU Parent) and Tom James Company (James) formed Carlisle Etcetera LLC (Carlisle). A James executive was appointed as Carlisle’s CEO, and through the CEO, James controlled Carlisle’s day-to-day operations. After Carlisle was formed, WU Parent transferred its member interest to a wholly owned subsidiary called Well Union U.S. Holdings, Inc. (WU Sub). Under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the LLC Act), the transfer rendered WU Sub an assignee, rather than a member. When the relationship between US Parent and James deteriorated, both sides agreed that one needed to buy out the other, but they could not agree on a buyout procedure or price. During negotiations over the buyout, James sought to use its privileged position to extract concessions from WU Sub. WU Sub petitioned the Court of Chancery to dissolve Carlisle. James filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because WU Sub was an assignee rather than a member, it lacked standing to petition for statutory dissolution under the LLC Act. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding (1) WU Parent and WU Sub lacked standing to petition for statutory dissolution under the LLC Act; but (2) WU Sub had standing to seek dissolution in equity. View "In re Carlisle Etcetera LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were four Delaware-domiciled captive insurance companies. The State Insurance Commissioner prosecuted their claims as their receiver in liquidation, alleging fraudulent conduct on the part of the companies’ president, breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the other directors of the corporation, and, as to the companies’ auditors and their administrative management company, aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence. The Court of Chancery dismissed in part the claims against the auditors and their company, holding (1) the doctrine of in pari delicto applies in this case and effectively bars the relevant claims against those defendants; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and negligence are dismissed on grounds of in pari delicto, but the fiduciary duty exception to in pari delicto covers Plaintiffs’ claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims for aiding and abetting against each of the auditors and the administrative management company is denied, except as they relate to the auditor that was retained second. View "Hon. Karen Stewart v. Wilmington Trust SP Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant First Aviation Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation, completed a 10,000-to-1 reverse stock split, which eliminated the interests of Plaintiff, a former stockholder of First Aviation. Four days later, the First Aviation directors adopted a non-reciprocal fee-shifting bylaw purporting to create fee exposure for former stockholders of the company and their attorneys in any challenge to the reverse stock split. Ten days later, Plaintiff brought this action against First Aviation and its directors (collectively, Defendants) on behalf of himself and a class of former First Aviation stockholders who had been similarly cashed out, alleging that the reverse stock split was unfair. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to challenge the bylaw. Defendants argued that the bylaw was enforceable in this case. Plaintiff moved for partial judgment on the pleadings that the bylaw did not apply here. The Court of Chancery granted Plaintiff’s motion, holding that because the bylaw was adopted after Plaintiff was cashed out of First Aviation by operation of the reverse stock split, the bylaw did not apply to this case. View "Strougo v. Hollander" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff retained Law Firm in connection with an action to inspect the books and records of certain defendants. Law Firm served as counsel in this litigation through the filing of claims against other defendants. In 2011, Law Firm withdrew as counsel. When some defendants prevailed at trial, the Court concluded that Law Firm should be awarded attorneys’ fees and expenses. Law Firm then moved to intervene, attaching a petition for a charging lien based on $766,166 in unpaid fees and expenses incurred in representing Plaintiff during the earlier stages of this litigation. The Court of Chancery granted the motion for leave to intervene, holding that Law Firm had an interest relating to the subject of the action, and Law Firm’s application was timely. View "Sutherland v. Sutherland" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned an underlying breach of fiduciary duty case that was coordinated with an appraisal proceeding, both arising out of a take-private transaction involving Dole Food Company, Inc. (Dole). During the proceedings, Defendants identified a corporation as their expert witness on the subject of Dole’s value at the time of the transaction. Plaintiffs objected, arguing that an expert witness must be a biological person. The Court of Chancery agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that an expert witness must be a biological person, and therefore, Defendants could not rely on the corporation that they designated to serve as their expert witness. View "In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the Chairman and CEO of Smashburger Master LLC until his termination in early 2014. Smashburger subsequently informed Plaintiff that it was redeeming Plaintiff’s units in the company. Plaintiff disagreed with Smashburger’s valuation of the units and demanded that Smashburger provide him with documents from specific categories of business and financial records. Smashburger refused Plaintiff’s request on the grounds that it had already redeemed all of Plaintiff’s units, thus terminating Plaintiff's status as a member of Smashburger and precluding him from properly demanding inspection. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against Smashburger. The Court of Chancery granted Smashburger’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff was no longer a member of Smashburger when he demanded inspection, and Delaware law does not provide pertinent inspection rights to former LLC members. View "Prokupek v. Consumer Capital Partners LLC" on Justia Law

After David H. Murdock, the CEO and controlling stockholder of Dole Food Company, Inc., acquired all the shares of Dole common stock that he did not already own, Petitioners pursued their statutory right to an appraisal of their shares of Dole common stock. During discovery, Dole sought information about any valuations of Dole common stock that Petitioners prepared, reviewed, or considered when buying to selling Dole common stock or when seeking appraisal. Petitioners objected to the document requests. Dole subsequently served notices of deposition for each Petitioner pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 30(b)(6) and identified the valuations as a topic of questioning. During the depositions, Petitioners’ counsel instructed the Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses not to testify about the valuations on the basis of relevance. Dole moved to compel production of the valuation-related information and for supplemental Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that, under the circumstances, Petitioners’ failure to provide the discovery was not substantially justified. View "In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc." on Justia Law