Justia Delaware Court of Chancery Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, Shareholder Representative Services LLC, acting as the Equityholder Representative, filed a breach of contract action against Defendant, Renesas Electronics Corporation. The dispute arises from a 2021 Merger Agreement under which Renesas acquired Celeno Communications Incorporated. Plaintiff alleges that Renesas failed to pay two Earn-Out Milestone payments related to the development of a semiconductor chip, the [REDACTED] Product, as stipulated in the Merger Agreement. Plaintiff seeks damages and specific performance of certain contractual provisions.The Court of Chancery assigned the action to the current court on November 6, 2023. Plaintiff filed its Verified Complaint on October 31, 2023, and Renesas moved to partially dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff then filed a Verified Amended Complaint on February 28, 2024, asserting four breach of contract claims. Renesas sought dismissal of Counts One, Two, and Four. Plaintiff opposed the motion, and Renesas replied. A hearing was held on September 5, 2024, after which the court took the motion under advisement.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court granted in part and denied in part Renesas's partial motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion regarding Counts One and Two, finding that Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the Tape-Out Milestone and Mass Production Milestone were met, despite Renesas's arguments to the contrary. However, the court granted the motion regarding Count Four, determining that specific performance of the meeting requirement was not warranted, as monetary damages would provide an adequate remedy. The court found that the contractual provision establishing irreparable harm was sufficient but noted that the ultimate relief sought was payment of the Earn-Out Amounts, not a meeting. View "Shareholder Representative Service LLC v. Renesas Electronics Corp." on Justia Law

Minority partners in various cellular telephone partnerships hired attorney Michael A. Pullara to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against the majority partner, AT&T. The client agreements allowed Pullara to hire joint venture counsel, and he retained Ajamie LLP. Both firms agreed to a 50% discount on their hourly rates in exchange for a contingency fee if they prevailed. After lengthy litigation, the minority partners reached a favorable settlement with AT&T. However, a dispute arose between Pullara and Ajamie over the fee division, leading Ajamie to file for a charging lien to secure its fee.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted a charging lien to preserve Ajamie’s claim against the settlement proceeds. Ajamie then sought to enforce the lien. The court held that the fee-sharing agreement between Pullara and Ajamie was unenforceable under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct because the clients had not consented to the specific terms of the fee-sharing arrangement. However, the court ruled that Ajamie was still entitled to reasonable compensation under the principle of quantum meruit.The court calculated Ajamie’s lodestar at $13,178,616.78, based on market rates adjusted annually. Considering the Mahani factors, the court found that an upward adjustment was warranted due to the complexity and duration of the litigation, the significant results obtained, and the partially contingent nature of the fee arrangement. The court awarded Ajamie a total fee of $15,814,340.14, including a 20% increase for the contingency risk. After deducting amounts already paid, Ajamie was awarded $13,014,721.87 plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The court ordered the escrow agent to release this amount to Ajamie. View "Cellular Telephone Company Litigation cases" on Justia Law

A Delaware corporation issued a proxy statement that misstated the voting standard for approving a charter amendment to increase its authorized shares of common stock. The proxy statement indicated that the amendment would pass if more shares voted for it than against it, applying a votes-cast standard. The corporation’s charter, however, states that an amendment requires approval by a majority of the voting power of all outstanding shares. The plaintiff argued that the amendment needed approval by a majority of the voting power of all outstanding shares, while the defendants relied on Section 242(d) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which they claimed imposed the votes-cast standard.The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the corporation from proceeding with its stockholder meeting unless the proxy statement was corrected to reflect the need for approval from a majority of the outstanding shares. The defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the votes-cast standard applied.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The court found that both the plaintiff’s and defendants’ interpretations of Section 242(d) were reasonable, creating ambiguity. The court examined extrinsic evidence, including legislative history and public policy considerations, to resolve the ambiguity. The court concluded that the Single Vote Provision in the corporation’s charter, which closely tracked the Class Vote Opt-Out, did not trigger a Majority-of-the-Outstanding Requirement. Therefore, the correct voting standard for the proposed amendment was the Majority-of-the-Votes-Cast Standard.The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court’s decision emphasized the intent to make it easier for corporations to increase their authorized shares, aligning with the public policy goal behind the 2023 amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law. View "Salama v. Simon" on Justia Law

A Delaware corporation's board of directors recommended reincorporating the corporation as a Nevada corporation through a conversion under Section 266 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The corporation's CEO controls approximately 49% of the voting power, making the conversion likely to receive the necessary majority vote. However, the corporation's certificate of incorporation requires a 66 2/3% supermajority vote to amend or repeal certain provisions. A stockholder argued that the conversion should be subject to this higher voting requirement because it would result in amendments inconsistent with the certificate's protected provisions.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the conversion unless the supermajority vote requirement was applied and additional disclosures were made. The defendants argued that the conversion was not subject to the supermajority vote requirement, relying on the doctrine of independent legal significance and relevant case law. Both parties moved for summary judgment.The court concluded that the supermajority vote requirement in the certificate of incorporation did not apply to the conversion under Section 266. The court emphasized that the doctrine of independent legal significance, as established in Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. and subsequent cases, requires clear and express language to extend special voting rights beyond actions taken under Section 242 of the DGCL. The court found that the language in the certificate did not meet this standard and, therefore, the conversion was subject only to the majority vote requirement under Section 266. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion. The court also entered a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) to allow for an expedited appeal. View "Gunderson v. The Trade Desk, Inc." on Justia Law

Wack Jills USA, Inc., formerly known as Jack Wills, Inc., assigned all its property and assets to SM Financial Services Corporation in August 2019 as part of an assignment for the benefit of creditors (ABC) proceeding. SM Financial, acting as trustee of the JW ABC Trust, sought court approval for final distributions and to close the case. Home Club Realty Trust, a general unsecured creditor, objected to the motion, citing concerns over the handling of certain assets and compliance with statutory requirements.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. The Assignee failed to comply with several statutory requirements under the Delaware ABC Statute, including not filing an affidavit of inventory within 30 days of the assignment, not seeking the court’s appointment of two appraisers, and not filing annual accountings. The Assignee also unilaterally posted a bond without court approval and retained its affiliated law firm, SM Law, as counsel, which raised concerns about the compensation structure and potential conflicts of interest.The court found that the Assignee’s pervasive non-compliance with the ABC Statute and its conduct in managing the assignment estate constituted sufficient cause for removal. The court denied the motion to approve final distributions and close the case, and removed SM Financial as Assignee pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 7386. The court extended the term of the Trust until further order and prohibited any distributions from the Trust without court approval. The bond remains in place and may be subject to further proceedings. View "In re Wack Jills, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC), Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV, was formed in 2018 with the goal of merging with a private operating company. In 2019, Hennessy completed its initial public offering (IPO), selling units that included shares of common stock and redeemable warrants. In 2020, Hennessy entered into a merger agreement with Canoo Holdings Ltd., an electric vehicle start-up. The merger was approved by Hennessy's stockholders and closed in December 2020.In the months following the merger, Canoo's new board decided to de-emphasize the company's subscription model and engineering services business line. This decision was announced in March 2021, causing Canoo's stock price to drop. The plaintiff, a Canoo stockholder, filed a lawsuit alleging that Hennessy's sponsor and directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to disclose changes to Canoo's business model prior to the merger.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismissed the plaintiff's claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the claim that Hennessy's directors knew or should have known about the changes to Canoo's business model before the merger closed. The court also dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment and aiding and abetting claims, as they were based on the same insufficiently supported allegations. View "In Re Hennessy Capital Acquisition Corp. IV Stockholder Litigation" on Justia Law

The case involves William J. Brown, the former CEO of Matterport, Inc., a technology company that creates 3D digital representations of physical spaces. Brown held almost 1.4 million shares of Matterport stock. In 2021, Matterport became a public company through a merger transaction. Bylaws adopted in connection with the merger included transfer restrictions thought to apply to all legacy Matterport stockholders, including Brown. Brown challenged the lockup in court as illegal and inequitable.In the lower courts, Brown argued that his shares were excluded from the lockup. The court agreed, ruling that the restriction applied only to public Matterport shares held “immediately following” the close of the merger. The court held that Brown never held lockup shares and was free to trade. Brown then sold his shares for total proceeds of approximately $80 million.In the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, Brown pursued a recovery of losses caused by his inability to sell sooner. He sought damages under the highest intermediate price method. The court concluded that Brown was entitled to damages, but declined to award them using the highest intermediate price. Instead, the court measured Brown’s damages using the average price of Matterport stock during a reasonable time that Brown would have traded if able. Brown’s net damages were approximately $79 million. View "Brown v. Matterport, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the validity of certain provisions in a governance agreement between BRP Group, Inc. and its founder. The founder sought to maintain control over the company while selling a significant portion of his equity stake. The agreement stipulated that as long as the founder and his affiliates owned at least 10% of the outstanding shares, the corporation had to obtain the founder's prior written approval before engaging in a list of actions. A stockholder plaintiff challenged three of these pre-approval requirements as invalid.The corporation argued that the plaintiff had waited too long to sue and had implicitly accepted the terms of the agreement by purchasing shares. However, the court rejected these arguments, stating that equitable defenses could not validate void acts. The corporation also claimed that a subsequent agreement, in which the founder agreed to consent to any action approved by an independent committee of directors, rendered the plaintiff's claims moot. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff's claims were not moot because the corporation had modified but not eliminated the challenged provisions.On the merits, the court found that the challenged provisions were invalid because they contravened sections of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to those provisions and denied the company's cross motion for judgment on the pleadings to a reciprocal degree. View "Wagner v. BRP Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a shareholder of Meta Platforms, Inc., sued the company's directors, officers, and controller, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties by managing the company to generate firm-specific value at the expense of the economy as a whole. The plaintiff argued that under Delaware law, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders as diversified equity investors, not just as investors in the specific corporation. The plaintiff proposed that Delaware law should change to adopt a diversified-investor model, particularly for systemically significant corporations.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they manage Meta under a firm-specific model, as required by Delaware law. The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted the defendants' motion, holding that directors owe firm-specific fiduciary duties. The court found that the plaintiff's argument was not supported by Delaware law, which contemplates a single-firm model where directors owe duties to the stockholders as investors in that specific corporation. The court also rejected the plaintiff's proposal to change Delaware law to adopt a diversified-investor model. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not made a persuasive case for such a change and dismissed the complaint. View "McRitchie v. Zuckerberg" on Justia Law

In the case of West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Moelis & Company (the "Company"), challenged the validity of certain provisions in a Stockholder Agreement between the Company and its CEO, Ken Moelis. The agreement gave Moelis extensive pre-approval rights over the Company's board of directors' decisions, the ability to select a majority of board members, and the power to determine the composition of any board committee. The plaintiff argued that these provisions violated Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), which mandates that the business and affairs of a corporation be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as otherwise provided in the DGCL or in the corporation's certificate of incorporation.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware agreed with the plaintiff, holding that the Pre-Approval Requirements, the Board Composition Provisions, and the Committee Composition Provision in the Stockholder Agreement were facially invalid under Section 141(a) of the DGCL. The court found that these provisions effectively transferred the management of the corporation to Moelis, contrary to Section 141(a). The court reasoned that while Delaware law generally favors private ordering, the ability to contract is subject to the limitations of the DGCL, including Section 141(a). The court emphasized that a provision may be part of a corporation's internal governance arrangement, and thus subject to Section 141(a), even if it appears in a contract other than the corporation's charter or bylaws.However, the court found that certain provisions were not facially invalid, including Moelis’ right to designate a number of directors, the requirement for the Company to nominate Moelis’ designees, and the requirement for the Company to make reasonable efforts to enable Moelis’ designees to be elected and continue to serve. View "West Palm Beach Firefighters' Pension Fund v. Moelis & Company" on Justia Law